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Introduction 
Organisations regularly face situations which require decisions to be taken, whether at a 
tactical or strategic level. Those decisions of a strategic nature, which guide an 
organisation towards a desired future state, whether that is (for example) to gain or 
maintain a competitive position or secure a turn-round, are of considerable importance to 
an organisation and are highly complex. Because of the importance of strategic decisions 
to the functioning, survival and development of an organisation, the process by which they 
are developed is important, particularly as it attempts to produce strategies which match the 
organisation with its business environment. In view of the critical nature of strategies the 
clearer our understanding is of the process by which strategies are developed and strategic 
decisions are made, the better our position for developing and implementing more effective 
and efficient processes of strategic decision making. 
Strategic decisions are characteristically ill- structured and non-routine and consequently 
they generally cannot be solved through the application of a standard formula. They are of 
particular concern to an organisation as they involve a large scale commitment of resources 
and so have potentially dramatic consequences. They are also complex in nature as they 
incorporate analysis of the wider competitive environment and of the strengths and 
weaknesses of the organisation and its specific functional areas (Schwenk, 1988b pp 6). As 
noted by Hickson, Butler, Gray, Mallory, & Wilson (1986 pp 28) strategic decisions tend 
to be “relatively unusual, substantial, and all-pervading”. These decisions are concerned 
with: an organisation’s long term direction and future; the scope of the organisation’s 
activities, in terms of its operations and markets; matching these activities to the 
environment in which it operates in order to optimise opportunities and minimise threats; 
and ensuring that these activities are compatible with the organisation’s resource capacity 
(Johnson and Scholes, 1988 pp 5-8). 
Given this complexity and the variation between and within organisations, in terms of the 
way they make strategic decisions and formulate strategy, it is not surprising that various 
explanations of the process by which these decisions are made have been advanced. 
Through a review of the strategic decision making literature, six perspectives or means of 
explaining the strategic decision making process have been identified. Briefly, these 
perspectives are: 
The planning perspective: The strategies followed by an organisation are the outcome of 
sequential, planned and deliberate procedures. Organisational goals are set, the 
environment and the organisation are assessed, potential options are generated, options are 
evaluated and the one which presents the optimum return is selected. Precise plans for the 
implementation of the strategy are then developed and the strategy is implemented in its 
exact form and in a “surprise free” manner. 
The logical incremental perspective: Strategies are formulated in a purposeful and 
intentional manner. However unlike the planning perspective strategies are re-analysed and 
modified throughout their development and implementation in accord with the 
environment. Strategic issues are dealt with sequentially as they arise. This is achieved 
through a tactical realignment of existing strategies or by developing alternative strategic 
options. These strategic options, initially developed from existing strategies, are assessed 
and further developed through a logical managed processes of experimentation and partial 
implementation. Options are constantly re-assessed throughout this process; those which 
are successful being incorporated within the organisation’s strategy and those that are 
inappropriate being eliminated. 
The political perspective: Here the formulation of strategy is directed by negotiation and 
bargaining between an organisation’s interest groups, both internally and externally, in the 
pursuit of their own desired outcomes. The influence these groups can exert over the 
process of strategy formulation increases as their access to power grows; power which is 
accrued through association to the dominant paradigm of the organisation, or through 
position, expertise, and control of resources. While all interest groups are not involved in 
every strategic decision, those which are involved form coalitions to sponsor their desired 
solution. Through negotiation, bargaining, and mutual adjustment a strategy acceptable to 
the most powerful interest groups emerges. 
The interpretive perspective: strategy is developed in accordance with the collective and 
shared assumptions of an organisation, or the organisation’s dominant paradigm. These 
commonly held assumptions about the organisation and the environment in which it 
operates are based on past experience, shared beliefs (both organisation and industry wide), 
and organisational culture. These assumptions: guide the organisation’s goals and 
objectives; direct the identification of strategic issues and options; modify the search for 
information, de-emphasising information which is not in accord with the dominant 
paradigm; and direct the assessment of options, those options in line with the paradigm 
being advanced in the organisation while those which are not being impeded. 
The visionary perspective: The formulation of strategy is directed by a vision of&e 
desired future state of the organisation, which is initially and primarily associated with an 
individual or small group. This vision is based both on intuition and a rational 
understanding of the organisation’s strategic problems. It provides the basis and direction 
for the organisation’s strategy. It is disseminated to the organisation’s members who 
“contract in” to the vision, and so authorise its pursuit. 
and finally 
The ecological perspective: The ability to fully determine the strategies followed by an 
organisation is not within the organisation’s control. The business environment in which 
the organisation operates impinges upon it, in such a way that strategies are prescribed and 
free strategic choice is severely restricted. Most organisations, except the very large, are 
unable to influence their operating environments further than buffering themselves from, or 
responding too, the environment. Strategic change occurs through a process similar to that 
of natural selection: variations occur within organisational processes, structures, and 
systems; those variations which are appropriate to the organisation are selected; and these 
positive variations are then retained, duplicated, and reproduced while the others are 
purged. 
While cursory examination may suggest little agreement between these perspectives on the 
process of strategic decision making, a closer examination may suggest that this is not the 
case. While each advanced perspective and their associated processes do account for the 
formulation of strategies they are not mutually exclusive. Indeed their interaction is highly 
probable. 
The following presents the various perspectives in greater detail. 
The Planniw Permective 
Strategies are developed through an intentional process of strategic decision making, which 
involves a logical, rational, planned approach to the organisation and its environment. The 
process attempts systematically and objectively to define strategic goals, to analyse 
environments (both internal and external to the organisation), and to collect and assess 
information on which strategic decisions can be made. Similarly potential options and 
strategies are produced and evaluated, the optimum strategy is selected and the techniques 
for its implementation are determined. Systems for controlling and monitoring the new 
strategy are developed and evaluated and finally the intended strategy is impleme?&d in its 
entirety. Hence, planning is a conscious process of making decisions systematically based 
on future predictions and expectations, organising the resources required to attain these 
decisions and assessing their outcomes against expectations and strategic objectives 
(Drucker, 1959). This process of decision making is devoid of personal emotion or 
political activity (Etzioni, 1989). Strategies are the direct result of specific decisions 
produced through well defined practices and procedures in response to specific issues. 
The “planning” process is logical and sequential in form: 
1) Clear and well defined strategic goals and objectives are set by the senior members 
of an organisation. These goals and objectives reflect an organisation’s desires, 
particularly in terms of shareholder value and profits, and operate as both targets and 
predictors for an organisation’s sales, costs, and profits (Cyert & Marsh, 1963 pp 
111). Through a systematic process these goals and objectives “stated in precise, 
quantitative terms” are pursued towards their realisation (Mintzberg, 1973). 
2) The organisation, acting in a rational unitary decision making manner [similar to 
that of an individual (Campbell & Gamett, 1989)] is aware of the environment and is 
conscious of any changes which present either threats or opportunities in terms of its 
specific goals and objectives, (Lyles & Thomas, 1988). This awareness is achieved 
through systematic analysis of the organisation and its environment, in terms of its 
strategic position, the position of competitors, and organisational strengths, 
weaknesses, and resource availability. 
3) Information concerning the strategic issue is collected through this systematic 
analysis. The information is evaluated and strategic options capable of attaining the 
goal or resolving the strategic issue are generated. 
4) These strategic options, or courses of action are assessed. The assessment is based 
on selection criteria which reflect the strategic goals and objectives to be achieved. It 
entails an assessment of the consequences of: a) the perceived alternative courses of 
action, b) the estimated consequences of these alternatives, for example, in terms of 
risk versus return, and c) the value of these consequences, for example, in relation to 
general resource implications and strategic goals. Based on these selection criteria 
those options with low value consequences coupled with high risk are unlikely to be 
selected, whilst those with high value consequences coupled with low risk have an 
increased likelihood of selection. It is during this and the above phase, that an active 
search for new opportunities and solutions to existing problems occurs. 
5) A strategic option is selected. The option which is perceived to maximise the value 
of outcomes, in relation to organisational goals and which is assessed to best fit the 
selection criterion (Aldrich, 1979 pp 107) is chosen. 
6) The requirements for implementing the selected strategic option are considered and 
appropriate resources are allocated. By considering the resources required for 
implementation, the systems for monitoring and controlling the new strategy and the 
programmes and procedures to guide future behaviour, the likelihood that the strategy 
will be successfully implemented is increased (Mintzberg & Waters, 1985). The 
strategies developed through this planned, sequential routine should be implemented 
fully and in a “surprise free” manner. 
This planned process of strategic decision making incorporates a periodic and systematic 
appraisal and review of the organisation’s strategies (Pitt & Johnson, 1987 pp 201). This 
ensures that longer term strategies and goals are compatible and that the strategies an 
organisation is following remain appropriate for the achievement of specific defined goals. 
Through this process strategies are determined and guided by those decision makers in 
senior management positions and implemented by those below (Mintzberg, 1978). “Top 
managers identify their goals; generate alternative methods of achieving them, weigh the 
likelihood that alternative methods will be successful, and then decide on which one to 
implement” (Chaffee, 1985). Goals are passed from the top downwards within the 
organisation, in the form of precise plans and programmes developed by these senior 
managers and elaborated in the form of budgets and schedules, to those implementing the 
strategy, who act but do not decide (Mintzberg & Waters, 1985). The strategic input of 
those organisational members not in senior positions is restricted to the provision of 
information or the implementation of strategy. 
Two underlying assumptions of this approach to strategic decision making are that the 
environment is seen to be “out there” and separable from the organisation (Chaffee, 1985), 
and that, through systematic and considered analysis, the uncertainty and complexity of the 
environment and the future can be reduced (Pitt & Johnson, 1987 pp 200). Through this 
comprehensive formal analysis, a sufficient understanding of the environment can be 
gained to facilitate influence over it (Mintzberg, 1973). It is this ability to influence or 
predict the environment which enables strategic decisions to be based on assumptions about 
the future (Chaff=, 1985). In turn this permits strategies to be planned, managed and 
implemented. 
Strategic decision making viewed in this logical and rational manner is appealing. 
However, the perspective fails to account for certain important aspects of decision making, 
particularly: the limitations of analytical rational behaviour; the interactions of management 
and stakeholders in the definition of organisational goals; and the exercise of free choice. 
Equally the characteristics of the individual decision maker or their organisation are not 
regarded as influencing the selection of a course of action (Stein, 1981). The selection, 
categorisation, and assessment procedures which enable information to be processed are 
however susceptible to individual influence and therefore not necessarily objective. 
Individuals operate within the confines of cognitive limitations (Marsh & Simon, 1958 pp 
136-g), are unable to handle unlimited amounts of information (Nom&a, 1988; Schwenk, 
1988b pp 14-16), and suffer from an inability to systematically assess strategic options and 
identify the optimal solution (Fahey, 1981). These personal limitations and the cognitive 
procedures adopted by decision makers to aid and expand their ability to handle 
information allow subjectivity to enter the process and render it less objective than may be 
hoped. 
Emewence of Strategies 
An assumption underlying strategies developed through this planned process is that they 
will be successfully implemented in their defined and intended form. Given that the 
planning process attempts to be analytical and objective the limitations, as described above 
and others such as unexpected shifts in the environment or unforeseen problems in 
implementation, can operate to restrict the efficiency of the decision making process, with 
the result that the strategy may not be implemented. Indeed what is “intended” strategy 
and what is “realised” strategy may not be identical (Mintzberg, 1978 and Mintzberg & 
Waters, 1985). While a specific and intended strategy may be implemented, equally the 
implemented strategy may be the result of an unplanned opportunity or an emergent 
strategy. 
Fig 1 about here 
Strategies then do not always form in the linear manner described by the planning 
perspective. They may come about more as an emergent strategy or in response to 
unplanned opportunity developing as the organisation adapts to cope with changes in the 
environment rather than from a deliberate and intended act. 
Moreover, in reality, the distinction between intended and realised strategies may not be so 
distinct. While strategies may come about as either intended or emergent, the two may 
interact. Strategies which start as intended may alter and become more emergent as they 
are implemented, and equally emergent strategies may become formalised and more 
deliberate as they enter the accepted wisdom of the organisation and are encapsulated 
within its longer term strategies. 
Here it must be noted that strategies are not necessarily what is espoused by the 
organisation or its senior figures, they are what the organisation is actually doing (see, for 
example, Liker, Roitman, & Roskies, 1987). They can be viewed as “patterns in a stream 
of decisions” (Mintzberg, 1978). 
Hence, strategies are not produced solely through intended, logical and planned processes 
of decision making, but can come about adaptively through the actions of management. 
These ud hoc strategies emerge gradually as actions are altered to cope with, and adapt to, 
the environment in a never-ending series of small steps. These small continual changes 
aggregate (Lindblom, 1959), and so reduce the need for large or major shifts in strategy. 
The process incorporates continual monitoring and assessment of both internal and external 
organisational conditions. Based on these assessments mall scale adjustments are made to 
maintain the relationship between the organisation and its environment. This process of 
monitoring, assessing and making appropriate adjustments, in accord with the environment, 
is a constant and on going activity, changes being made in a continuous rather than 
sequential manner (Chaffee, 1985). Strategies developed in this ad hoc fashion are not 
necessarily haphazard and non-directed but are simply responses to changes in an 
unpredictable environment. 
While incremental evolutionary change is primarily slow and progressive, more dramatic 
change may occur if the relationship between the environment and organisation alters more 
substantially. In stable environments strategies do not need to change, any change required 
will typically be incremental and enable the organisation to operate in a gradually changing 
environment. While an organisation is doing well there will be a strong tendency not to 
alter existing successful strategies (Tushman, Newman, & Romanelli, 1986; Watson, 
1969). As an organisation’s strategy develops “momentum” any changes which occur will 
generally develop incrementally in a direction consistent with existing strategy and past 
experience rather than involving large scale changes in direction (Miller & Friesen, 1980). 
However as an organisation and its environment increasingly mismatch, incremental 
refinements of strategy may not keep pace with environmental changes. As a situation 
develops and becomes more acute, either through large environmental change or strategic 
drift (the organisation becoming out of line with the environment), minor or piecemeal 
change may not easily remedied the situation (Hedberg, Nystrom, & Starbuck, 1976). 
Here more global strategic change, incorporating significant and simultaneous reversals in 
strategy (Miller & Friesen, 1980), or the introduction of a new gestalt (the general 
paradigm and underlying theory which guides the organisation) may be required to realign 
the organisation and its environment. 
Strategy formulation then is not a regular, stable and sequential process. The environment 
and its changes affect the pattern of strategy formulation. As Mintzberg (1978) has 
identified, patterns of strategy formulation differ. Periods of strategy formulation range 
from those typified by “continuity”, where strategies remained unchanged, to those of large 
and dramatic change, which occur infrequently. 
Strategic change which occurs in this adaptive manner can be explained by one of three 
perspectives, the logical incremental perspective, the political perspective and the 
interpretive perspective or indeed in their combination. 
Lo&al Incrementalism 
This mode of strategic decision making, unlike the planning perspective, does not assume 
that strategic decisions can be aggregated into a single decision matrix which requires a 
simultaneous and planned process of analysis, solution and implementation in a holistic 
manner. The formal processes of an organisation are viewed as unable to analyse and plan 
all possible strategic variables concurrently, (Mazzolini, 1981; Simon, 1976 pp 80-82; 
Allison, 1971 pp 78-98; Cyert & March, 1963). Instead issues are segregated into their 
constituent parts and dealt with sequentially as the components require attention. 
Strategy emerges logically in incremental steps from a series of “strategic sub-systems” 
each of which is concerned with a specific type of strategic issue (Eg. acquisitions, major 
reorganisations). In a standardised and structured manner these strategic sub-systems, 
based on their powerful underlying logics, identify and produce solutions to “key strategic 
issues”. These strategic options in turn aggregate and emerge as organisational strategy. 
Strategies tend “to evolve as internal decisions and external events flow together to create a 
new, widely shared consensus for action among key members of the top management team” 
(Quinn, 1978). The process is directed and purposeful, incorporating proactive 
management techniques which integrate and improve the analytical and behavioural aspects 
of strategy formulation. The incremental restructuring of strategies occurs in accordance 
with the environment, as a step by step rational reaction to the environment. An analysis 
of each situation and aspect of the environment is undertaken prior to the introduction of a 
phase and the cumulative result is an appropriate shift of the organisation. 
This incremental process allows managers to improve the quality of strategic decision 
making (Quinn, 198Oa; 1982). This process broadens the information base available, 
builds organisational awareness and increases the active search for opportunities and threats 
not previously defined. It also increases the number of strategic options which are actively 
considered, systematically involves those with specific knowledge and those who must 
implement the strategy and resists premature commitment or closure of areas for debate. 
Further incremental decision making allows managers to: cope with varying lead times; 
order the needs of the strategic sub-systems (Allison, 1971 pp 92); decrease personal and 
group resistance; and reduce strategic uncertainty (Mintzberg, 1973) by facilitating active 
learning between the organisation and its environment. The process although initiated by 
precipitating events does not allow these to force strategic decisions. 
Strategic goals tend to be arrived at incrementally, through an awareness of needs rather 
than by way of a highly structured analytical process (Quinn, 1977). Due to the limited 
information available these goals tend to be vague, general and non rigid in form (Quinn, 
1980b). Their broad nature provides guidance in strategic direction but does not act to 
restrict the possible scope of activity (Quinn, 1978). Final organisational commitment to a 
specific strategy or goal is characteristically delayed so as not to restrict any additional 
exploration in areas of possible solution or goals. 
While clearly defined goals may focus an issue, they may also stifle ideas and indicate to 
members of the organisation that the process of strategy development is closed to further 
suggestions or thoughts of alternatives (Quinn, 198Oa). They may also solidify positions, 
eliminate the development of creative strategic options and even crystalise active resistance 
towards the goal. In contrast, broad organisational and strategic goals can build consensus 
and enable potential opportunities and threats to be sensed. Equally, this permits the 
development of various potential strategic options and allows planning and budgetary 
processes to more clearly define options and solutions to problems over time. By keeping 
these goals general, cohesion is cultivated by gaining commitment to broad strategic 
objectives, rather than crystalising fractional resistance to a specific objective (Quinn, 
1977). Within this system of broad objectives, specific goals are promoted for tactical 
purposes, in situations where immediate action is required. 
Awareness of the need for strategic change does not tend to emerge from formal systems of 
planning, scanning, or reporting but is gained through unconstrained, loose and non 
specific processes (Quinn, 1982). Informal networks, which short circuit the established 
information and control systems by gaining information directly from organisational 
members (such as line managers and executives), both raise organisational awareness of 
potential strategic issues (Quinn, 1977, 1980a) and aid problem diagnosis (Mintzberg, 
Raisinghani, & Theoret, 1976; Norbum & Grinyer 1973/74). These informal networks, 
which may be logically and intentionally manipulated by senior management, allow the 
process of information sensing to be amplified to generate a clearer and broader 
understanding of an underlying issue. The information from these informal systems, which 
may concern, for example, organisational position, potential problems, their possible 
solution and the need for change, is gained through the sensing of signals, such as internal 
performance measures, customer reaction and localised environmental changes (Norbum & 
Grinyer, 1973/74). Although these networks increase the flow of information they do not 
serve as channels of authorisation. This is derived from the formal systems within the 
organisation (Quinn, 198Oa). 
In contrast, formal systems may operate as filters, presenting only “appropriate” 
information to the strategic decision makers (Argyris, 1977). These formal systems, which 
operate with substantial lag times, may recognise anomalies within the organisation at a 
stage of crisis too advanced for efficient action and response to be undertaken (Quinn, 
198Oa). 
This process of strategic decision making encourages key players to view strategic issues 
and analysis potential options dispassionately and without personal commitment to any 
particular option (Quinn, 1978). Alternative options are assessed through a screening 
process of continual selection and development (Johnson, 1987). Because the impact of 
alternative courses of action cannot always be known prior to implementation (Lindblom, 
1959), strategic options are assessed through limited exposure to the environment and 
experimentation. The process operates to eliminate or encourage potential options in 
accordance with their assessed appropriateness; it does not operate to identify the best or 
optimal solution (Mintzberg et aI 76). 
This system of limited exposure and assessment is cyclical in nature and encompass 
feedback loops to previous phases where the problem and solution may be re-defined or re- 
formulation (Lyles, 1981; Lyles & Thomas, 1988). Similarly further assessment of 
strategic options may be undertaken or additional alternatives developed. Because of the 
nature of the process early commitment to options is kept broadly formative, tentative and 
subject to review. By means of ongoing analysis and assessment of strategic options and 
their incremental refinement, options are developed and modified as the environment 
changes. 
Through the exclusion of personal commitment to particular options, existing strategies and 
their associated belief systems may be incorporated within this process of experimental 
assessment and if discovered to be inappropriate discarded in a “no lose” situation. In 
general the process attempts to broaden interest in an issue, to reduce reliance on past 
strategies, and not to stultify potential options by cultivating the discussion, questioning, 
and challenging of the issues and options (Quinn, 1982). 
Options which are familiar or established within an organisation are perceived to be of 
lower risk than new and unfamiliar options. Therefore any attempt to introduce strategic 
options that are perceived to be of higher risk requires that their legitimacy be established. 
This may be achieved through discussion of the strategic issue within an appropriate forum 
to improve the level of information upon which a decision will be based. This also 
increases familiarity with possible new options and encourage their positive evaluation 
(Quinn, 198Oa). Through increased experience of analysis and rejection of strategies and 
opportunities within specific fields, the expertise of the decision maker increases along with 
their comfort level and familiarity with possible strategic options. Similarly the perceived 
level of risk associated with a strategic option may be reduced. Through the limited 
implementation of an option and its assessment hrough formal procedures “comfort levels” 
can be built, allowing a movement towards the pursuit of more riskily perceived strategic 
options over time (Quinn, 1978). 
This procedure of experimentation and familiarisation facilitates the adoption of successful 
options which are subsequently merged to become patterns of action and the organisation’s 
strategy, Changes in the environment are matched with small scale changes in procedures 
(Schwenk, 1988b pp 47). These initial responses tend to be tactical realignments of 
existing strategy and therefore are not met with opposition (Quinn, 1980; 1982). As events 
unfold strategies become sharper and more focused. The organisation becomes more 
directed and aggressive in its pursuit of strategies (Quinn, 198Oa) in the knowledge that the 
potential adverse effects for the organisation have diminished, as strategy and environment 
fit. 
By incremental strategic change the strengths of an organisation are retained. “Guiding 
executives try carefully to maintain the enterprise’s ongoing strengths while shifting its 
total posture incrementally - at the margins - towards new needs” (Quinn, 198Oa). The 
incremental nature of the change permits experimentation and learning without excessive 
risk to the organisation. It allows new data to be included in a strategic solution and new 
situations to influence the shape of the final solution as concrete decisions are restricted to 
the separate phases of strategy development and final commitment to a specific option is 
postponed for as long as possible. 
The full consequences of the implementation of a new strategy or product cannot be 
assessed prior to its introduction and only subsequently assessed through interactive 
analysis. It is therefore beneficial to delay any final decision to allow feedback on options 
and their respective consequences. These delays facilitate a clearer understanding of the 
influence of a precipitating event to be gained, the additional investigation of options and 
their consequences, and more substantial expert critique and managerial input (Quinn, 
198Oa). Correspondingly they allow more time for the assessment and discussion of 
potentially threatening issues and permit the evaluation of old as well as new options 
(Quinn, 1982). This also increases the likelihood of acceptance of new alternative options. 
Additionally the delays can increase an organisation’s technical and market efficiency even 
allowing for the added cost of parallel efforts and experimentation. 
This process of strategic decision making involves a conscious and managed assessment and 
re-assessment of the organisation, its resources, and environment. Formal planning 
procedures and techniques are often employed to integrate and assess organisational 
requirements, threats and opportunities. However while the individual steps and phases of 
the process are managed proactively, the whole process is not sequentially managed 
(Quinn, 198Oa), nor is the process necessarily orderly, discrete and sequential (Quinn, 
1982). 
Incremental processes handle emergent issues and monitor long term direction. Future 
options are constantly re-assessed, altering the organisational mix of resources and skill in 
reaction to the changes in the environment hence reducing risk and increasing opportunity. 
As Quinn (1982) points out “successful managers who operate logically and proactively in 
an incremental mode build the seeds of understanding, identity and commitment into the 
very processes which create their strategies”. 
While both the planning and logical incremental perspectives present explanations for 
strategic decision making, they tend to centre on organisational procedures rather than 
processes influenced by an individual or group. The following two perspectives address 
this, looking at the influence of the individual or group on strategy formulation f?6m a 
political and interpretive stance. 
The Political Permective 
Organisational strategies can be seen to emerge through the political processes of 
bargaining, negotiation and compromise between organisational interest groups each 
attempting to achieve their own ends (Cyert & March, 1963). These interest groups each 
have different concerns (Feldman, 1986; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978 pp 259; Zaleznick, 
1970) and are able to exercise different levels of influence (Heller, Drenth, Koopman, & 
Rus, 1988 pp 206-g). Strategies are finally adopted because they are acceptable to both 
those influencing the decision making process and those who must implement the strategy, 
and not solely because they fulfil an objective criteria (Johnson, 1987 pp 29). The 
organisation’s strategies are not directly chosen and are rarely unanimously agreed upon. 
The strategies followed by an organisation are susceptible to both internal and external 
influences (Hickson et al, 1986 pp 14) or the influence of stakeholders [“any group or 
individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the organisation’s objectives” 
(Freeman, 1984 pp 46)]. These stakeholders can include customers and clients, auditors, 
trade associations, shareholders, supplier firms, government departments and agencies, 
competitors, and trade unions (Hickson et al, 1986 pp 63; Freeman, 1984 pp 55). The 
extent to which an organisation will respond to the wishes of a stakeholder is conditional 
upon the influence they can bring to bear. “Organisations will comply with demands of 
various stakeholder groups to the extent that they are dependent on these groups” 
(Schwenk, 1989). This dependency and its associated power, relies both on the 
organisation’s need for a resource, whether financial, material or custom, and the potential 
difficulty in replacing the present external stakeholder as the source of that resource 
(Hickson et al, 1986 pp 66). Their use of influence though may not always be direct or 
intentional, indeed it may be indirect and based on the perceptions managers hold of an 
interest groups desires. 
The influence of external groups is reflected in the internal power structure of the 
organisation. Those groups inside the organisation which deal with the external 
environment (“boundary spanners”) tend to attain greater levels of influence and power 
over strategy, (Jemison, 1981). This increased influence is gained through the “boundary 
spanners” ability to resolve uncertainty and secure scares or critical resources required by 
the organisation. Similarly internal stakeholder influence relates to their ability to “create 
critical uncertainties” for the organisation (Schwenk, 1989). This influence though is 
conditional upon the organisation’s dependency on the external group with which they deal. 
The greater this dependence the greater the influence (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978 pp 259; 
Hickson et al, 1986 p 67). 
As with boundary spanners, control of critical resources and the ability to resolve, reduce, 
and manage uncertainty can enhance power and influence (Hickson, Hinings, Lee, 
Schneck, & Pennings, 1971; Hambrick, 1981). This is particularly true where the 
availability of information is of critical importance. The information on which strategic 
decisions are based may be “filtered” to reflect the perceptions and priorities of the interest 
group providing that information, through their pre-selection of information and their 
attribution of its level of importance. Through restricting information flow the legitimacy 
of the demands of certain interest groups is advanced (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). 
Decisions are subsequently taken based on information distorted by the preferences of the 
information providers. These internal groups additionally may exercise their influence, 
acquired by access to resources, to manipulate the organisation’s resource allocation and so 
protect or enhance their position by gaining access to more resources (Pfeffer & Salancik, 
1974; 1978). 
External influence over strategy is not restricted solely to stakeholders but also incorporates 
the wider environment. This relationship, as with the stakeholders, is a two way process of 
negotiation; the environment influencing the organisation and the environment being 
influenced by the organisation, (Dirsmith & Covaleski, 1983). Again, as with the 
stakeholders, the level of negotiation between organisation and environment is affected by 
the extent to which the organisation is dependent upon the environment, a factor which 
may lead to conflict between the two. 
Power is not located solely within the levels of senior management. It is distributed 
throughout the systems and allied sub-organisations which make up the organisation. 
While power is not centralised, as such, it does reflect the values of the organisation or 
more precisely the values of the dominant interest groups. However, centralised control 
systems do exist and operate to alleviate friction between interest groups or organisational 
sections and to ensure that strategies are generally compatible with the dominant values. 
The level and type of these controls are influenced by various factors which include: a) the 
nature of the task, b) measures of performance, c) the information available to the 
controlling group, d) the degree of resource allocation, and e) the systems of rewards and 
punishments. But these centralised control systems are rarely use to intervene in the sub- 
systems and the decision making process (Allison, 1971 pp 168-173). 
The goals and objectives which drive the organisation are generally informal, operational, 
and primarily concerned with the “health” of the organisation and the avoidance and 
alleviation of organisational disaster and discomfort. They are derived from the bargaining 
and negotiations of the interest groups and are directed by the constraints and operating 
boundaries which emerge through the resolution of conflicts. “The goal system of the 
organisation is characterized by bargaining among these interest groups with each winning 
some issues and losing others” (Mintzberg, 1973). As issues relating to a goal arise they 
are dealt with sequentially and within those constraints associated with that goal. 
Following Narayanan & Fahey’s (1982) model of the po1itica.l decision making process, the 
various phases (which are non linear) can be seen: 
1) Initially individuals become aware of impending strategic issues. 
2) As the potential impact of a strategic issue upon the organisation increases and its 
associated deadlines and time scales become more impending, attention is focused on 
the issues which forces it into a strategic arena for debate and solution. Awareness of 
an issue then moves from the individual to the organisation. The issue is introduced 
into the strategic arena through established channels which structure and guide the 
issue through the political process of negotiation and bargaining (Allison, 1971 pp 169- 
70). These channels influence how an issue is perceived by the decision makers and to 
a large extent predetermine who will be involved in the decision making process, their 
point of entry, and often the unit which will implement the eventual strategy. While 
the rules which guide and govern the process are set by precedent and organisational 
culture, the extent to which they are rigidly followed may alter between each decision 
situation. Just as the rules of the process may alter so may the procedural influence of 
the channel. The form a decision process follows within a channel feeds back into the 
structure of that channel and so modifies its future procedural influence. 
3) As the issue enters the strategic arena, coalitions form to pursue shared objectives 
associated with the issue. These, or individual interest groups, subsequently sponsor 
different strategic options for the solution of the issue. The stake an individual or 
group has in a strategy is determined by the issue at hand in relation to their own 
interests. 
4) Confrontation, negotiation, and bargaining between the coalitions occurs as they 
each attempt to secure the whole or partial use of their preferred solution in resolving 
the issue. This situation of conflict is inevitably given that the coalitions are bidding 
for the limited resources of the organisation, (Johnson, 1987 pp 30). The degree of 
success a coalition has in having their solution adapted in turn advances or impedes the 
group or individual and their interests. 
5) The process of negotiation and mutual adjustments permits a commonly acceptable 
strategy to emerge (Mintzberg & Waters, 1985). Compromise and consensus, based 
on learning from the environment and each other, allows the interest groups to 
eventually produce a strategic decision which is acceptable to the dominant interest 
groups. 
As earlier stated the information on which the decisions are based is often selective and 
reflects the interests of those providing that information. This, coupled with the 
relative haste of the political decision making process, allows misperception to occur 
through lack of information or time to assimilate that information. These mis- 
perceptions and the speed of the process produce a situation in which individuals of 
different interest groups can compromise around hazy facts and options. 
6) The strategy is subsequently translated into plans and action for implementation. 
The unit to implement the strategy is often predetermined by the channel through 
which the strategic decision has been made, though this unit may be decided as part of 
the decision process. Even at this stage the strategy is subject to influence and 
alteration particularly from the interest group responsible for implementation. Further, 
the miscommunication or misinterpretation of the determined strategy may lead to the 
implementation of an emergent strategy rather than that which was intended. The 
perceptions and interests of an individual or group implementing the strategy 
influencing the form of this emergent strategy. 
The influence and power a stakeholder or group can exert over the decision making process 
relate to various contingencies though inevitably it is based on the organisation’s need to 
acquire resources to secure its survival (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). This influence and 
power can be gained and legitimated in various ways: a) by virtue of a position within the 
organisation and the control of systems this allows, b) the culture of the organisation, c) the 
power of expertise, d) the delegation and use of power derived from the organisation’s 
political systems, e) the control of information used to define problems, identify options, 
and assess consequences, and f) the control of resources, particularly those required to 
implement a strategy. While a stakeholder may derive a certain level of influence from 
these contingencies its actuality is moderated by various factors. These include their 
bargaining advantage, bargaining skills, willingness to exert their power and equally their 
perceived willingness to exert this power by others involved in the process (Allison, 1971 
pp 168-69). 
The influence of a stakeholder, whether individual or group, is not constant across channels 
or from decision to decision (Hinings, Hickson, Pennings & Schneck, 1974). Their 
bargaining advantage, and both perceived and actual willingness to exert power, 
correspondingly alter between decisions and across channels. The channels and decision 
situations determine both stakeholder influence and the dynamics of influence, in terms of 
any increase or decrease in influence level throughout the process. For example, the 
influence of top level decision makers decreases as a strategy enters the implementation 
stage, while the influence of lower level managers increases. 
Changes in the environment or in the organisation’s structure may affect the contingencies 
on which a group’s power rests (Hinings et al, 1974) and so consequently the configuration 
of both internal and external power and influence may alter. Similarly new strategies, 
products or processes which prove successful will attain greater proportions of the 
organisation’s resources ensuring a shift in the power structure of the organisation (Quinn, 
1978); a shift which will subsequently result in an alteration in organisational position and 
culture to reflect the new power base. 
The strategies followed by the organisation develop as the compromise between the 
conflicting demands of different interest groups each attempting to pursue different aims 
and seek to exercise control over a finite set of resources (Johnson, 1987 pp 30). To gain 
influence over the decision making process and to attempt to attain a desired outcome, 
power and authority are exercised. In turbulent times, when an organisation faces 
uncertainty, the orientation of interest groups may change and become less predictable and 
hence the process of decision making becomes more susceptible to influence (Spekman, 
1979). As the power of established interest groups fall and realignments occur, a more 
fruitful opportunity for negotiation and bargaining is created. 
The Intemretive Persmctive 
The strategies an organisation follows can be seen as more attributable to culture and 
cognition than to any objective planned response to the environment. Organisational 
culture sets the norms and expectations of the organisation and guides action, while 
cognition enables individuals to internalise this culture and its constituent parts, enabling 
them to interpret and operate within the organisation and business environment. These two 
components are distinct yet highly associated. Indeed this may be viewed as a symbiotic 
relationship. 
The strategies pursued are a reflection of the culture and collective shared assumptions of 
the organisation. These assumptions and the “taken for granted” are usually referred to as 
“schema” at the individual level. Correspondingly, at the group or collective level they are 
termed “myths” (Hedberg & Jonsson, 1977), “paradigms” (Sheldon, 1980; Pfeffer, 1981a; 
Dightonm, 1980) and “interpretive schemes” (Bartunek, 1984). They act as a guide for 
action, both at the individual and organisational level. Strategies then are based on a 
shared interpretation of the world developed experientially and through social contracts and 
liaisons. 
Culture is by its very nature highly influential in how events are perceived and which 
behaviours are instigated. The idea of culture has been advanced through two schools of 
thought: that which views culture as the “taken for granted” and that which sees culture as 
the artifacts and routines of an organisation. In this discussion culture is assumed to 
encompass both schools; the values, ideology and beliefs of an organisation and the 
symbols, rituals and routines it possesses. Through a process of socialisation, involving the 
use of rituals, stories, images and myths, culture is conveyed within the organisation and 
between its members (Wilkins, 1983; Martin & Powers, 1983). This relationship is 
somewhat cyclical, with the culture being supported and shaped by the commonly held 
assumptions, beliefs and values of the organisation which in turn the culture helps to 
establish. It is the symbols and symbolism associated with the culture which describes the 
organisation to its members, operates to control aspects of the organisation, and also 
maintains its established system by securing coherence to these (Dandridge, M&off, & 
Joyce, 1980). 
Organisations faced with the same “objective” environment may react and behave 
differently, though in accord with their respective cultures. The subsequent response may 
result in the pursuit of significantly different strategies across organisations. These 
potential difference in strategy result from a premise that organisations view the “objective” 
environment differently. The perception and view of the organisation and the environment 
in which it operates is socially constructed (Berger & Luckmann, 1966). It is developed 
through association and experience and intrinsically linked to the perceiver. Therefore the 
values and assumptions of the organisation will directly affect how a situation is perceived 
and similarly will influence the strategy followed. By interaction and communication this 
view of the world is confirmed, modified or indeed replaced in accord with the shared 
social assumptions of the organisation. Through the use of symbols and stories the 
organisational paradigm (the shared view of the world) is presented to those from both 
“inside” and “outside” the organisation to allow them some understanding of its common 
perception of the world and so enables appropriate behaviour. Strategies then develop in 
accord and within the confines of an organisation’s dominant paradigm; developed through 
common belief and experience. 
Because of this influence of culture on strategy formulation attempts are made primarily by 
senior management, to control and manage the symbols and ritual which create meaning 
within the organisation. This is particularly important as strategy development is an 
organisation wide process (Van Cauwenbergh & Cool, 1982) and is not located solely with 
senior management. Although influenced by culture themselves, the position of these 
managers enables them to manage, to some degree, the symbols and rituals which shape 
organisational attitudes, expectations, and perceptions, and which in turn influence 
behaviour and strategy followed. 
The process of altering an organisation’s culture or its ideology - which are resistant to 
change (Janis, 1985) - is likely to be resisted if perceived to be excessive. Because the 
paradigm is shared within the organisation and accepted by individuals as their own, 
situations which necessitate exploration outside the dominant paradigm for strategies to 
cope with environmental changes are often traumatic and resisted. Equally existing power 
groups may restrict the organisation’s system to support the established paradigm and 
reduce possible erosion, which change or external pressures may threaten. 
In this perspective strategies are the product, not of precise planned approaches to the 
environment, but of attitudes, values, ideas and perceptions common among the members 
and stakeholders of an organisation. These shared assumptions and beliefs which constitute 
an organisation’s “taken for granted”, manifest as learned responses to problems in the 
external environment (Schein, 1985 pp 6). They emerge primarily as the programmed 
output of an organisation’s strategic decision making process. They are the organisation’s 
“natural” reaction to a situation and are established through organisational routines, heavily 
influenced by the organisation’s paradigm and systems. These routines or standard 
operating procedures (SOP) are employed to fulfil standard strategic tasks, such as 
monitoring the environment, identifying problems, producing information, and generating 
solutions. 
These standard operating procedures, which incorporate organisational programmes, 
repertoires, and routines developed to deal with specific situations, are available for 
enactment as appropriate situations arise. They are retained and based within the 
organisation culture (the way we do things around here). Where problems are familiar, 
routines or precedents may be activated to solve the problem (Cray, Mallory, Butler, 
Hickson, & Wilson, 1991). As a situation emerges an appropriate SOP is activated to deal 
with it; where events are reoccurring and very similar, the SOP is likely to be successful. 
However, while the SOPS may be appropriate for specific situations, there is a danger that 
they may become routinised within an organisation’s repertoire of activities and so become 
the natural response to a generic situation, possibly resulting in a formalised and sluggish 
response to new situations. Here the possibility of inappropriate responses or missed 
opportunity is a distinct prospect. 
The culture and dominant paradigm of an organisation can only direct strategy through the 
individuals who take decisions and implement the strategy. This is achieved by providing a 
framework through which the world can be interpreted (Schwenk, 1988b, pp 17) and 
decisions made in line with the paradigm. Such frameworks are usually comprised of 
shared assumptions in the organisation which manifest, as “a dominant shared logic” 
(Prahalad & Bettis, 1986) and enable decisions to be made in a perceived rational and 
logical manner, even in the face of uncertainty. Theses shared assumptions often take the 
form of assumed trends in the environment and of organisational resources (Schwenk, 
1989) or reflect the desires of the stakeholders (Mason & Mitroff, 1981 pp 95). The 
cognitive and perceptual processes operating within an organisation orientate the definition 
and solution of a strategic problem internally so that the response is based within the 
domain of the organisation (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978 pp 260) and the history of its 
members (Nutt, 1984). 
The manner in which these frameworks are acquired and utilized has generated 
considerable interest amongst researchers. Indeed, socialisation, interaction between 
individuals, joint decision making and experience all contribute towards the building up of 
concepts and knowledge concerning the organisation’s practices and the business 
environment in general. Because individuals are limited in the amount of information they 
can process at any one time, they employ selective procedures (Hogarth, 1980) and code 
their world and interpret it using cognitive models. These procedures give rise to the 
formulation of mental representations of the world or schema (Bartlett, 1932) and 
constructs (Kelly, 1955). Here schema are defined as a symbolic representation of 
knowledge and experience (for example, facts, skills, processes and social/personal 
experience) in memory. They broadly represent the attributes and relationships between 
aspects of the environment and associated beliefs and assumptions about it. These schemas 
become compiled into frames of reference that are utilised for guiding decisions and 
behaviour. These frames of reference or mental maps have been known as “cognitive 
maps” (Tolman, 1948), “frames” (Minsky, 1975), and “scripts” (Schank & Abelson, 
1977). They are developed by individuals in order to simplify their dealings with the 
complexity of situations (Simon, 1976 pp 96-97 and also see Ch. 5). They are based on 
previous experiences, the dominant paradigm, and shared beliefs and assumptions. With 
increasing experience, new schemas are formed and added to deal with novel situations. 
Hence, the reality of an organisation need not necessarily be an objective externally 
perceived reality but rather, a subjective and socially constructed belief system acquired 
through association and experience; the symbols and stories of the organisation allowing 
those “outside” to gain some understanding of its reality. Reality is both interpreted and 
established through the schema and frames of reference, which define beliefs, perceptions, 
and ways of operating (Shrivastava & Mitroff, 1983). 
The shared organisational assumptions, made about the environment and beliefs about 
cause and effect, form the basis of the schema and frames of reference used to interpret the 
world (Schwenk, 1988b, pp 17). These schema provided by the culture of the organisation 
and developed through personal experience, enable an individual to interpret the world and 
behave in a manner which is “in fit” with the expectations of the organisation. They are so 
influential that they provide a ready-made interpretation of new situations (Weick, 1979 pp 
38). The schemas then enable organisational stakeholders, both internally and externally, 
to interpret the organisation and environment in which it operates (Chaffee, 1985). 
The meaning they provide allows a shared interpretation of reality and guides strategy, 
while social interaction establishes the ground for operation. They provide an 
interpretation of the organisation, it’s perceived relationship with the environment, the 
direction for information searches and a screening mechanism for information or an 
individual’s ideas. These schema facilitate decision making, the diagnosis of issues and the 
formulation of problems (Schwenk, 1989). Based on these, stakeholders can operate in 
ways which are perceived to be beneficial and favourable to the organisation. They 
provide a guide to appropriate behaviour to situations (Gioia & Poole, 1984) and remove 
reliance upon pure stimulus response actions. The usefulness of the schema increases as 
situations become more ambiguous and the efficiency of formal processes decreases (Beyer, 
1981). However personal motivation and biases may colour these process and result in 
differing views of the nature and characteristics of a situation (Lyles & Thomas, 1988). 
When new situations arise they are interpreted based on both what has occurred in previous 
similar situations and on what the dominant paradigm would indicate is appropriate; new 
situations are not perceived to be unique (Schon, 1983 pp 138). The information gained 
from each new situation is subsequently used to confirm the original schema, if this new 
information fits the schema’s general characteristics. However, if the information is not in 
accordance with current beliefs, the schema may be altered in an appropriate m&er, or 
the information may be treated as an extraneous event and ignored. In this way frames are 
self rationalising and supporting through the selection of information used by the decision 
makers (Kiesler & Spoull, 1982) and the attribution of importance to information based on 
the paradigm. Information which is not in accord with the dominant paradigm tend to be 
ignored, de-emphasised or attributed to non valued groups. 
When strategic problems emerge which are outside the immediate frame of reference and 
the organisation’s SOPS, cognitive processes such as analogy or metaphor are used to 
simplify, communicate or understand the new situation (Schwenk, 1988b, pp 23-25). As a 
situation emerges it is related to previously experienced and similar situations, allowing 
previously developed schema to be applied to this new situation (Schwenk, 1988a). Here 
existing schema are applied to new problems, transferring the schema from one domain to 
another. This is accomplished through the interpretation of cues for a new situation and 
through assessing these against past similar situations and their schema, therefore the 
development of a totally new schema is not required (Schwenk, 1989). The understanding 
of the situation and its response is based on past experience. At the organisational level, 
situational analogies are useful in the creation of a common shared image and maybe drawn 
from other firms in the same industry; they are not restricted purely to within organisations 
(Huff, 1982). Similarly shared beliefs and assumptions are not restricted to the individual 
or single organisation level but are argued to exist on an industry wide basis (Spender, 
1989 pp 6; Grinyer & Spender, 1979; Huff, 1982), in the form of commonly accepted 
“recipes”. 
Those strategic issues which are not solvable using these processes may require a new 
schema to be developed, through the application of heuristics and biases. These heuristics 
or “rules of thumb” and biases enable complex problems and situations to be simplified by 
providing cognitive short cuts. Heuristics in the form of perceived probability of the 
consequences of action are determined by various factors, such as ease of recall, the results 
of the most recent experience, and the eventfulness of the last occurrence (Schwenk, 
1988a; Barnes, 1984). While biases emerge through the inappropriate estimation by 
individuals of their control over an issue or event (Schwenk, 1984; 1986) and the 
subsequent mis-estimation of the likelihood of success &anger & Roth, 1975). Beliefs are 
created and supported by the selectivity of information gathering which emphasises 
information in support of the hypothesis while de-emphasising or ignoring that which is not 
&anger, 1983 pp 24). The information search typically reinforces and supports the 
heuristics and biases. However, while heuristics may form efficient information processing 
short cuts they may also lead to erroneous decisions (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), 
precisely because of their nature of simplification. 
When faced with mounting alternative and disproving information about the effectiveness 
of a strategy, generated through formal monitoring systems, such as down turn in profits, 
new strategies are developed. Initially these are based on, and in line with, the paradigm, 
though the changes to strategy may inevitably alter the paradigm (Johnson, 1987). If these 
small scale alterations of strategy are not successful an inevitable paradigm shift may be 
required. A change which may be emotionally fraught and stressful (Lewin, 1952) given 
that the paradigm has been accepted for years. The resultant strategic change should 
produce major realignments both in terms of the organisation and the individual. The 
frames and schema used to interpret the world will consequently be reorientated, while the 
assumptions underlying the former schema may be rejected or reduced in importance. 
These changes in strategy inevitably involve changes to organisational symbols, including 
visual representations, rituals, and myths which legitimate and support the frame of 
reference. Acceptance of this new paradigm is enhanced through persuasion and symbolic 
manipulation rather than by coercion (Pfeffer, 1981a, 1981b). 
Strategies are consistent with the culture of an organisation and its dominant paradigm, 
they involve improvements to existing systems and strategies or the implementation of 
others congruent with the culture and paradigm. The process in this state is typified by 
adjustments rather than by major change. Schema and frames of reference, though helpful 
in the interpretation of the environment and generation of solutions, are problematic in that 
the frame they impose may not be appropriate for the situation they are being used to 
interpret and may result in the adoption of an inappropriate solution and strategy. This 
may result in strategic drift and an eventual need for radical realignment. These situations 
of innovative strategic change which involve movement outside the dominant paradigm and 
are heralded by precipitating events or crisis require discontinuous, radical and dramatic 
strategic change. This level of change is usually accompanied by a distinct shift in 
paradigm with the new strategy being based within the new dominant paradigm. 
The Visionarv Permective 
The strategy an organisation follows can also be seen as emerging from the vision of its 
leader or a past leader. This vision, which represents the desired future state of the 
organisation (Jaques & Clement, 1991 pp 102-3; Rowe, Dickel, Mason, & Snyder, 1989 
pp 57-58), directs the organisation’s strategy and the process by which its strategic 
decisions are made. There are many examples of visionary leaders who have turned 
organisations around, leading them from situations of crisis into periods of dramatic 
growth. However this form of strategic leadership is not restricted to merely dramatic 
turn-round situations. The prospect that an organisation’s strategy may be directed by a 
vision has gained increasing support and interest, particularly as a means of managing 
progressively more complex organisations (Westley & Mintzberg 1989). 
Generally, three components can be identified in the development of this visionary control 
of strategy (see for example Kotter, 1990 pp 5). These are: the determination of the 
organisation’s direction through the development of a vision which represents the desired 
future state of organisation, product, or process; the alignment of the organisation’s 
members behind the vision through its articulation and communication to those 
organisational members who must support it (Rowe et al, 1989 pp 57-58; Bennis & Nanus, 
1985; Gluck, 1984); and the empowerment and authorisation for its pursuit through the 
motivation and inspiration of the organisation’s members, who in accepting the vision 
authorises its pursuit and facilitate the vision’s enactment (Conger & Kanungo, 1987). 
However, the sequential and chronological appearance of these stages is not generally seen 
to be the case in reality (Westley & Mintzberg, 1988). 
The vision which is persistent and consistent (Bryd, 1987) is often based on radical ideas. 
It may challenge the accepted norms of the organisation, contradict its established 
principles and paradigm (Trite & Beyer, 1986; Rowe et al, 1989 pp 57-58), and go beyond 
familiar organisational experience and knowledge (Trite & Beyer, 1986). By addressing, 
and responding too, organisational problems and crisis in a non standard manner a vision 
may gain the broad consensus and support which is required if its enactment is to be 
achieved. 
A vision may typically be perceived to be developed entirely through inspiration and 
intuition, however it is equally probable that it is developed from experience or through an 
interaction of the two. In either case, whether for inspiration to prove meaningful and 
effective or experience is to be fruitful, a sufficient level of familiarity and knowledge of 
the organisations strategic issues is necessary. This knowledge and familiarity is developed 
through exposure to, and experience of, these important strategic issues, whether process, 
product or structure. It is this experience, exposure, and familiarity which enables 
innovation to be made, through the adding of new to the well understood and certainty of 
the old. A process which involves the integration of both conscious and unconscious 
mechanisms. Visionary perception would appear to develop “as much through practice and 
gut-level feel for the business, product, market, and technology, as through conscious 
cognition” (Westley & Mintzberg, 1989). While experience is important for inspiration 
and the development of a vision it need not be gained within the industry to which the 
vision is to be applied, indeed diverse career paths incorporating experience in other 
cultures (Schein, 1985; Norbum, 1986) have been seen to be useful. 
The originator of a vision may attain visionary status within an organisation, however the 
attainment of this position is not reliant on the generation of the original vision or its 
underlying idea. Indeed this position may be achieved by virtue of activity in any of the 
three phases, vision, communication, and empowerment or across more than one. 
Visionary status may be acquired through: the generation of an idea and vision; the ability 
to effectively syntheses existing visions or catalyse others into producing visions; the 
competent and proficient communication of a vision within the organisation; or the 
organisation’s history may ensure that a specific individual or senior position bestows 
strategic leadership status. The process of developing visionary status then is not standard, 
however it inevitably places enormous control and power in the hands of the visionary who 
gains the “capacity to translate intention into reality and sustain it” (Bennis & Nanus, 1985 
PP 17). 
For an idea or vision - however appropriate to the organisation - to become its strategy it 
must be effectively articulated and communicated. This process of communication is as 
important as the vision itself (Rowe et al, 1989 pp 58). Presentation must place the vision 
firmly within the paradigm of the organisation, though not at the same time allowing the 
paradigm to restrict the vision. Its nature must appear to remove or alleviate a source of 
discontentment and fulfil the desires of an organisation in a planned and achievable way 
(Conger & Kanungo, 1987). Acceptance of the vision is aided by presenting the vision to 
the organisation’s members as their own (Johnson, 1989). Belief in the vision increases in 
situations where it is perceived to solve an organisational problem or fulfil an 
organisation’s aspirations, though this may wane if it is perceived to be excessively radical 
in its realised form. 
The language and symbolism employed in communication are critical to the process of 
acceptance. The application of the linguistic tools of metaphors, rhetoric, and imagery, 
amongst others, can encourage acceptance and pursuit of the vision (Garfield, 1985 pp 83) 
and enable petition for adoption through both logical or emotional appeal (Pfeffer, 1981b). 
Similarly non verbal communication such as symbolism can elaborate communication and 
amplify the appeal of the vision. Acceptance of the vision and the subsequent change and 
learning this involves can be encouraged through the actions, gestures and timing of the 
leader acting as a role model (Bennis & Nanus, 1985 pp 204-5). Equally, the rituals of the 
organisation can be employed to encourage visionary change (Trite & Beyer, 1985). This 
evocative and emotional process of communication attempts to inspire people and can both 
strengthen the link between a vision and its enactment and also an organisation’s members 
and the visionary. 
This process of transforming a vision into strategy is not uni-directional but is two way. 
For a vision to become strategy it must be shared and receive assistance in its development. 
It is the recipients of a vision who provide the authority for its realisation; a visionary alone 
can not turn a vision into strategy, the members of an organisation are required to assist. 
The authorisation for the vision’s pursuit comes from its acceptance by the organisation’s 
members (Trite & Beyer, 1986). In accepting the vision the organisation responds by 
concentrating resources for its pursuit. In a similar way authority is attributed to the 
visionary through a belief both in the vision and their ability to secure its realisation, rather 
than through any democratic process. 
The acceptance of the vision may be enhanced through the positive encouragement of 
individuals empowered to pursue the vision. By providing emotional support and 
persuasion, presenting a successful role models, facilitating the mastery of the new 
situation and the development of responsibility, acceptance of the vision may increase 
(Bandura, 1977; Kotter, 1991 pp 67). In effect the process is aimed to develop an 
individual’s sense of their own effectiveness and facilitate internalisation of the vision 
(Conger, 1989). In these situations some form of “cognitive re-definition” is likely to be 
involved and the provision of a cognitive “safely net” may enable and ease the 
internalisation of change and its associated vision. 
Along with the importance of the vision, its communication, and its empowerment, is the 
influential effect of the visionaries personal characteristics and particularly those concerned 
with leadership. In this area there is a growing recognition that leadership is a multifaceted 
entity (Johnson, 1990) and that all visionaries are not of the same mould or proponents of 
the same style of leadership. However, certain characteristics and styles have been 
identified as being particularly influential in visionary leadership. In general visionaries 
are perceived to be trusted and concerned about the needs of their organisation and its 
members rather than their own self interest (Walster, Aronson & Abrahams, 1966); a 
concern which is not merely espoused but which is demonstrated through actions, which 
are often perceived to be potentially costly to the leader in pursuit of benefits for the wider 
good (Conger & Kanungo, 1987). These visionaries tend to be: in touch with the feelings 
of the organisation’s members and their needs (Byrd, 1987); capable of unfreezing what is 
regarded as established and traditional within the organisation without excessive 
consideration of any personal discomfort which may result (Schein, 1985); and able to 
create a common vision within the organisation which relates to the organisation’s shared 
values and beliefs and which can be translated into every day behaviours to encourage its 
acceptance (Berlew, 1974; Byrds, 1987). Similarly other capacities have been associated 
with these leaders. Both Garfield (1986; pp 31-48) and Byrds (1987) identify three general 
capacities or attributes: a visionary aptitude; an ability to identify potential organisational 
opportunities and threats; and an ability to both build a team to compensate for their own 
shortcomings and work within it. Additionally, Garfield (1986) further identifies a self 
confidence which enables learning from past mistakes and mental agility and concentration. 
Byrd (1987) also states that visionaries are capable of adapting to change without the lose 
of momentum and are able to empower others and be empowered by them. 
Although leadership charisma is produced in part by these characteristics and others, its 
realisation is dependent upon the dynamics and interplay of the relationship between a 
leader and an organisation’s members. A relationship which is affected by the perceptions 
an organisation’s members hold of the leader. Here several factors associated with the 
organisation’s perceptions of the leader influence this relationship, for example, a leader’s 
perceived: credibility; belief in a vision; ability to attain the vision; and integrity and 
genuineness. Likewise, the innovative solution of problems, which go beyond the 
restrictions associated with a particular strategic arena to result in a desired change; the 
ability to assess realistically the environment in terms of resources and constraints in 
bringing about appropriate change; and the persuasive techniques employed by a leader in 
articulating a vision to organisation’s members are all affected by, and influence, the 
perceptions of a leader. 
It is clear then that the factors which go to produce the visionary are not standard and 
indeed this status can be achieved though varying combinations. While visionary status is 
seen to develop from charismatic authority based on the interrelationship between the 
leader and the organisation’s members, it is also seen to emanate from two other sources: 
traditional authority and legal-rational authority (‘Rice & Beyer, 1986). Charismatic 
authority, as described above, derives authority from the charismatic nature of the leader 
and the organisational members belief in the leader and particularly their exceptional 
qualities. However it is not a prerequisite that the visionary need possess these qualities to 
ensure this status. The structure of the organisation may be such that it endows individuals 
with the qualities required to empower position and attain authority (Kanter, 1968). The 
empowerment and development of a leader maybe situation specific (Goodstein & Boeker, 
1991) and have more to do with the context and structure of the organisation than particular 
personal qualities of the individual (Kotter, 1991 pp 129-138). In this situation the leader 
represents the collective values of the organisation rather than being the source of these 
values. Their charisma is bound up with, and possessed by, the organisation and its 
symbols, it is not particularly associated with their individual characteristics. 
Although visionary authority and power can be attained by virtue of charisma or through 
radical organisational change, it is unstable and may reduce with the passage of time or 
changes in situational context. However authority can be retained through the emergence 
of a new crisis situation or through the routinisation of the vision or visionary position 
within the organisation. As noted by Trite & Beyer (1986) ” . . unless charismatic 
authority is either embodied in traditional authority or becomes routinised within the 
framework of rational-legal authority, it is destined to disappear as a briefly influential 
historical oddity”. Similarly, the retention of a strategic vision beyond the visionary or its 
situation of emergence, requires that it be routinised or institutionalised. Through 
routinisation the vision becomes a component of the organisation’s culture and systems, 
which enables it to survive past the visionary or indeed the visionary’s successors. 
It is the routinisation of a visionary or a vision within the culture of the organisation which 
ensures the associated authority will not diminish. As with failure on the part of the 
visionary or the vision, participation in and association with the mundane aspects of 
corporate life will hamper the processes of routinisation and compromise belief in the 
vision (Berlew, 1974). Without the routinisation of the vision and charisma within the 
organisation’s culture and symbols, its longevity, transference and diffusion throughout the 
organisation are not ensured and the vision and charisma will fade over time (Rice & 
Beyer, 1986). However even without routinisation charisma is a substantial and potent 
force for the achievement of change. (Trite & Beyer, 1986). 
No matter how innovative a vision, genuine and articulate a leader, a vision’s realisation as 
strategy is limited by the appropriateness of the leader, the audience, and the context. The 
qualities and characteristics required in a leader are determined to a large extent by the 
context in which they are to operate which in turn must bear some relevant relationship to 
the characteristics, activities, and goals of the organisation and its members. The 
interaction of these variables though is in constant flux and motion (Bass, 1981, pp 65-67). 
A crisis situation is not guaranteed to produce a visionary, nor is an individual possessed of 
all the appropriate components, or an organisation structured to endow the required 
characteristics. It is the interrelationship of the context, the individual (both characteristic’s 
and experience) and the audience which creates a visionary and a strategic vision capable of 
enactment and development into strategy. 
The Ecolos4cal Permective 
The ecological model of strategic decision making posits that organisations have little or no 
control over the choice of strategies they follow. Factors in the environment impinge on 
the organisation in such a way as to select and encourage the adoption of organisational 
structures and activities which best fit that environment (Hannan & Freeman, 1974; 
Aldrich 1971; 1979). Although this perspective has also been termed “evolutionary”, it is 
not evolutionary in the full biological sense, with a distinct progression towards better, 
more complex structures through process advancements. It is however evolutionary in that 
organisations move, through modification to their systems, towards a closer fit with the 
environment. In short, those organisations with structures and factors which appropriately 
“fit” their specific environment will function more effectively than those without. The 
prevalent organisational form within an environment will be that which optimally adapts to 
the constraints of that environment, consequently the form taken by organisations operating 
within the same environmental constraints will be highly similar, (Hannan & Freeman, 
1982). 
Similarly, this perspective has been termed the “natural selection model” though again this 
does not conform to natural selection in its purest form - that of survival or extinction. The 
process of natural selection in this context applies to organisational modification and not 
solely organisational survival and extinction (Aldrich & Pfeffer, 1976; Hannan & Freeman, 
1974; 1982). The total extinction of large organisations occurs very infrequently, 
particularly as these organisations tend to operate within niches and rarely fail totally. 
Additionally intervention in the market, such as governmental legislation, acts to limit the 
effect of the environment: organisations then are able to survive and prosper through partial 
and separate modification of their structure and not through complete organisational fit. 
Based on this view, organisations are seen to be severely limited in their ability to make 
strategic decisions outside those which are common to all organisations within their 
industrial sector or market. Freedom of choice exists but only within limited bounds 
determined by the environment. “Various external constraints have been identified as 
sharply limiting the role that participants play in selecting an organisation’s structures and 
activities” (Aldrich, 1979 pp 136). The level of freedom in strategic choice which is 
suggested by other perspectives is not endorsed. 
As the ability to influence strategic direction is limited within the wider environment, due 
to environmental constraints, organisations attempt to attain some degree of control by 
operating within niches, which are able to support the organisation’s form (Aldrich, 1979). 
Effectively a niche is the convergence of resources, demands and constraints which both 
enables and restricts the operation of a population of organisations (Zammuto, 1988). 
These environmental attributes are dynamic and susceptible to manipulation and change as 
an organisation adapts to environmental constraints (Aldrich & Mueller 1982). They are 
not “out there” but develop with the organisation or its population of organisations 
(McKelvey & Aldrich, 1983). Organisations enters a niche through a choice between 
feasible options, for example, to be specialists or generalists; discount or quality; but they 
are unable to assess the potential viability of the niche prior to entry; success or failure can 
only be known after the fact. Once within the niche organisations are only able to operate 
with the resources made available to them. 
Although environmental constraints may motivate organisations to select a niche or 
competitive environment for entry, the same conditions which encourage the process may 
also prove to constrain it (Goodstein & Boeker, 1991). Barriers to entry operate to restrict 
access to environments, particularly those already serviced by other organisations. Caves 
(1972) identifies three such barriers to entry. The unit production costs for an organisation 
remain higher than their competitors until they secure a substantial market share, at which 
point they are able to over come the barrier of economies of scale. The cost of achieving 
these economies of scale are significantly large to present cost barriers to entry and so 
exclude the majority of possible new entrants to a market. Similarly, product 
differentiation barriers ensure that new entrants most allocate larger proportions of product, 
or organisational expenditure, to the development of organisation or brand awareness than 
established organisations who are highly visible and their brands highly distinguishable. 
These and other barriers and constraints restrict organisational choice in terms of operating 
environments and the possibility of entering new environments. They also account for the 
slow rates of change within certain industries. The higher the barriers to entry within an 
industrial sector, the less change is required and therefore the less change will occur. 
Indeed the act of selecting an operating environment may in fact only be a poste 
rationalised reflection of the planning and rationality exercised when involuntarily entering 
a niche market (Starbuck, 1976). 
While strategic choice may be restricted, change does occur. Aldrich (1979) indicates that 
the process of strategic change in an organisation follows three phases. Changes initially 
occur within an organisation through variations in its processes, structures, and systems. 
Selection criteria, determined by the environment, subsequently operate to select those 
variations which are appropriate and beneficial to the organisation, in terms of its goals, 
activities, boundaries and form. Retention mechanism operate to retain duplicat&and 
reproduced variations which are positively selected and purge those which are not. This 
process of variation, selection, and retention results in long term organisational 
transformations rather than short term changes, which develop in responses to local 
conditions (Aldrich, 1979). 
The source of variations which provides the raw materials for selection may be either 
random or planned; successful variations are those which match changes in the environment 
to produce advantage. Because decision makers operate under constraint, such as cognitive 
limitations, biases, poor communications, and social pressures and influence, their ability 
to generate appropriate adaptive variation may be restricted (Aldrich, 1979). While the 
process of organisational innovation and variation may occur as a rational intentional 
response to the environment through deliberate innovation or alteration of behaviours, they 
may equally occur unintentionally. Variations may develop as an imperfect imitation of a 
successful structure, system or process or through seemingly inappropriate changes to 
these. Similarly they may emerge through conflict over control of resources; ambiguity of 
organisational reality; accident; errors; tactical moves; and luck (Aldrich & Mueller, 
1982). Strategic change relies on the occurrence of variations, the source and underlying 
reasons for which are not considered to be important. 
Variations which occur are not solely restricted to within organisations but also occur 
between them (Aldrich & Mueller, 1982). These inter-organisational variations tend to 
relate to the form and structure an organisation takes thought they may also relate to the 
processes and systems operating within them. These variations occur through the creation 
of new organisations, structures, and processes; the transfer of an organisation to a new 
owner or sponsor; or the introduction of the organisation into a new operating 
environment. Within differentiated organisations variations are often produced through 
internal transformation, for example turnover of leaders or the rotation of managerial 
personnel. But from whatever form variations emerge, their result is to increase the chance 
of survival for an organisation or an organisational form. 
As organisations grow and increase in complexity their potential for variation and therefore 
change increases. The variations, whether produced through intent or through clumsy and 
non refined processes, may prove inefficient in the short term though result in the 
generation of appropriate variations for the organisation in the longer term. It is these 
variations which produce the potentially advantageous or dangerous innovations for the 
organisation (Hirschman, 1970). The organisational advantage produced by variations tend 
to be eroded over time as knowledge of the variation or innovation diffuses to the 
competition. The time scale for this diffusion is reduced in those industries whitishare 
similar organisational processes and structures, and where effective and efficient 
communication occurs. 
From the variations which emerge those which are more adept at obtaining resources, 
either from the organisation or the environment, and which contribute to the organisation’s 
or sub unit’s survival are retained. Those organisations with variations which are 
advantageous in the acquisition of resources, as compared to the competitors, have an 
increased chance of survival (Aldrich & Mueller, 1982), as they more efficiently achieve 
their goals within the constraints of the environment. Variations which positively fit the 
environmental constraint are selected and retained, while those which do not, fail and die 
or are altered to match the environment (Aldrich, 1979). Selection processes such as 
control systems, operational norms and culture operate within the organisation to select out 
non appropriate variations. However, over zealous control systems may operate to select 
out those variations which are in fact beneficial along with those which are not, for 
example, successful spin offs rejected by the parent organisation (Aldrich, 1979). 
Aldrich (1979) identified three general areas in which selection operates: 
Selective dzJksion: Information flows between organisations about variations and changes 
in structure and activity, the successful innovations or variations are subsequently imitated. 
Organisations are not passive participants within this process, but actively attempt to keep 
abreast of developments and innovations occurring in other organisations. This process of 
interchange, copying and borrowing occurs most efficiently where highly similar 
organisations operate within the commonly shared constraints of a resource pool where the 
appropriateness of variation increases (McKelvey & Aldrich, 1983). Choice does exist in 
this process, to the extent that a decision is taken to “borrow” a variation or not. Where a 
variation or specific organisational competency is required but is not possessed by an 
organisation and its development is potentially inefficient, an organisation may acquire it 
through a process of interchange, for example searches or personnel transfers (McKelvey & 
Aldrich, 1983). The process of interchange is not totally free flowing and restrictions 
operate; particularly as there is a tendency to be wary of “the new”, whether ideas, people, 
or knowledge, which is not from within the organisation. 
Selective retention of successfil activities: Organisations retain those activities and forms 
which are successful. To achieve this successful variations are passed to the organisation’s 
members and across organisational generations through culture, symbols, sociabsation, 
administration and training. 
Inter& selection: In an effort to retain stability and consistency organisations attempt to 
encourage those behaviours which are regarded as appropriate and successful while 
discouraging those which are not. Reinforcement, social pressure and control systems are 
brought to bear to realise these desired ends. This process of selection is more able, than 
the others, to operate in ways unrestricted by the environment especially where the 
organisation is insulated from environmental pressures. However this operation may result 
in the retention of inappropriate and redundant variations due to organisational culture and 
the lag time before the impact of an inappropriate retention becomes evident. 
Organisations operating in an environment compete for its resources, the most effective 
organisations acquiring a large proportion of these (Aldrich, 1979). Organisations though 
try to reduce their dependency on the general environment through adaptation and the 
development of a niche. However, those organisations which do develop niches and are 
highly adapted to a particular environment “may be adversely affected by any significant 
changes in the environment” (Aldrich & Mueller 1982). Large organisations which are 
not overly adapted or specialised, are less susceptible to environmental pressures than 
smaller highly adapted, more specialised organisations. However, these larger more 
complex organisations may be less able to adapt quickly and so tend to concentrate in stable 
environments, while smaller less complex organisations may tend to operate within unstable 
highly dispersed environments (Aldrich, 1979). 
Variations in form, structure and activity which have been selected as beneficial to an 
organisation will be retained both within that organisation and across the organisational 
population (McKelvey & Aldrich, 1983). These beneficial variations are retained through 
various processes such as: diffusion; external pressure, for example, government 
legislation or the interests of powerful sponsors; an organisation’s bureaucracy via 
information collection and administration; shared beliefs and culture; recruitment and 
socialisation; continuity of leadership and the selection of the succession (Aldrich, 1979). 
Organisational constraints then operate to restrict deviation from these successful forms and 
also act against the loss of successful variations by imposing standardisation and control 
systems to protect the organisation from undue procedures and the mutation of beneficial 
variations. 
Because strategy emerges through environmental selection, as opposed to direct strategic 
choice, the greater the heterogenity of variations the greater the richness for selection and 
the closer the subsequent organisation-environment fit. 
The ability of organisations to modify and influence their environments is restricted to the 
very large. The smaller organisations which make up the majority in most industries are 
relatively unable to influence their environments. However these organisations may 
attempt to react to and manage the external environment though “collective response” 
(Aldrich, 1979) in such forms as trade associations or chambers of commerce, because 
individually they are relatively powerless to affect the strategy environment selection 
process (Aldrich & Pfeffer, 1976). Equally, the ability to influence and resist 
environmental pressures also varies between industry (Hirsch; 1975). Although certain 
organisations may be able to influence their environment the attempts organisations make to 
do this are often restricted to buffering themselves from environmental pressures, rather 
than actually changing external conditions. 
Discussion 
It is evident from the above descriptions that each of the six perspectives can describe or 
explain some aspects of the process of strategic decision making within organisations. 
However, the very complexity of the decisions making process makes it unlikely that one 
perspective would adequately describe the process operating in all organisations, in every 
situation, and at any point in time. Furthermore the processes these perspectives describe 
are not mutually exclusive. One perspective and its associated characteristics is not correct 
and another wrong. The perspectives are in effect descriptive as opposed to prescriptive. 
Because organisations continually face changing problems it would seem probable that the 
processes activated to solve these would similarly alter. 
W ith the exception of the ecological perspective two general views of strategy formulation 
are cumulatively advanced. Firstly, strategy formulation is viewed as a “logical” process, 
which can be managed pro-actively in an attempt to understand the complexity of the 
environment, to establish patterns of causality and to generate strategy which matches an 
organisation’s resources with the environment. Secondly, strategy formulation results from 
the political, cognitive, and cultural facets of management and leadership. The two views 
and their underlying perspectives however are not necessarily unrelated or contrary. The 
interrelationship is such that the pro-active management and “logical” approaches may in 
fact result in the development of “emergent” strategy as opposed to “intended” strategy. 
Adaptive change may result from a conscious employment of procedures associated with 
the planning and “rational” process, as well as influence from the political and social aspect 
of the organisation (Quinn, 1980; Pondy, 1983). 
The anomaly within these perspectives is the ecological perspective. Although problematic 
the perspective is useful. It represents the broader influence of the environment upon the 
organisation, in interpreting strategic decision making. It demonstrates the constraints 
which operate to restrict organisations to niche operations, and the subsequent restrictions 
on their choice outside what is possible within that niche. The restrictions on choice may 
be overstated since the opportunity to exercise strategic choice does occur. However, the 
ability to choose may ultimately be restricted by such things as barriers of cost, location, 
product life cycle and organisational size. 
Viewed in a more integrated fashion strategies may be seen to developed through adaptive 
change which incorporates elements from all the perspectives. Awareness of strategic 
issues may tend to manifest at the individual level through the sensing of indicators 
(Johnson, 1987 pp 25; Lyles, 1981). This initial awareness is confirmed and expanded 
through periods of incubation (Lyles, 1981, Mintzberg, 1973 pp 21; Johnson, 1988) and 
further “sensing” of organisational signals, for example internal performance measures, 
customer reaction and environmental changes (Norbum & Grinyer, 1973/74). As Lyles 
and Thomas (1988) point out individuals interpret environmental stimuli or organisational 
signals differently. This interpretation relates to the experience and expectations of the 
individual, their perceived interests and preferences, and their association to the 
organisational culture. The result of these differences mean that the definition of a 
strategic problem and its possible solutions also differ. The analysis of the environment 
and the organisation which the planning process and its incumbent procedures enable can 
contribute to this understanding and sensing. The process can define and make explicit the 
strategic issues, opportunities, threats and constraints which face the organisation. 
However, this is inevitably problematic and requires to be undertaken with awareness of 
the social and cognitive limitations of the organisation and its members and of the influence 
of stakeholder groups. It is hoped that the information generated in this way is less 
susceptible to excessive filtering which attempts to ensure it is in fit with the paradigm or 
with the interests of certain groups. 
Throughout this period of “sensing”, potential strategic responses to issues are generated. 
Initially, managers either search for ready-made or previously successful solutions, or they 
develop a response through the tactical realignment of existing strategies. Where this is not 
possible, solutions will be developed by incremental adaption of existing strategies 
previously used in similar or familiar situations. Where required new alternatives may be 
developed directed by an interaction of social, political, and cultural factors. Sensing 
continues until a “triggering point” is reached, often at which point the formal monitoring 
systems indicate a potential problem, (Lyles, 1981). The solutions are then presented to 
the organisation and maybe implemented on a low commitment, trial basis. This process is 
iterative in nature, the selection and development of solutions occurring concurrently and 
continually (Johnson, 1987). Options are assessed through limited exposure to the 
environment. Those options assessed to be inappropriate, based on both perceived and 
analytical criteria, are eliminated the other options are developed further, the successful 
options, which fit the organisation’s vision, being incorporated within the organisation’s 
strategies. Successful options are not selected as the “best” or most appropriate but are 
those which remain after the inappropriate ones have been eliminated. 
The shared beliefs and assumptions of an organisation produce a consensus and 
homogeneity of opinion and facilitates the development of organisational strategy in line 
with the past and the dominant paradigm. Reaction to changes in the environment is 
adaptive in nature and commonly agreed upon, political negotiation resolving any 
conflicting demands and interests in the process. However organisations also require some 
degree of heterogenity or at least the facility to transgress the bounds of the organisational 
norms in search of opportunities and solutions. These two aspects though contradictory in 
the terms of control and autonomy, enable organisations to react to unexpected alterations 
and enact appropriate strategic change, reducing the potential for strategic drift. W ithout 
the integration of control and autonomy, organisations may well be able to incrementally 
alter as the environment changes, however the restrictions of the culture, cognitive models 
and political process, may render them unable to enact and develop strategic change outside 
their shared and dominant belief systems. This may result in strategic drift and require a 
large and dramatic realignment incorporating the alteration, amendment or even rejection 
of the dominant belief system. A major shift which may be facilitated by the development 
of a new organisational vision or through a “controlled challenge to the paradigm” 
(Johnson, 1987 pp 282), to enable the organisation to adaptively realign or allow more 
substantially realignment outside the organisational paradigm if required. 
The strengths of each perspective and their underlying processes in explanation of the 
strategic decision making process, comes through their combination and not in their sole 
and isolated use. As environments and environmental conditions alter the use of these 
processes change, their level of importance and utility increasing and deceasing with 
respect to these changes. The perspectives explain much of an organisation’s strategic 
decision making through their diverse combination. Research by Johnson (1987) has 
already indicated that different processes of strategic decision making can occur 
concurrently within the same organisation. So while each perspective in isolation may not 
explain all decision situations their combination may do so more reliably. It is therefore 
suggested that a clearer understanding of the process of strategic decision making and its 
complexity may be facilitated by using these perspectives simultaneously in a multiple 
perspective approach to the explanation of the process of strategic decision making. 
Analysis of strategic decision making using this multiple perspective approach should 
permit differences and similarities to be identified in the processes of strategic decision 
making operating within an organisation, between organisations and indeed across 
industrial sectors. Similarly, it should enable the premise to be tested that these processes 
do not operate in isolation but are in fact interrelated and appear within organisational 
decision making in the form of patterns of processes. Patterns which may differ between 
situations and organisations due to the affects of time, context and situation. Equally, it is 
desirable to examine whether particular strategic issues are dealt with in similar or 
dissimilar manners across organisations or industries, whether managers within the same 
organisation agree or disagree on the patterns of processes at work within their organisation 
and whether this perception differs across managerial groups. 
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